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MEDICAL MONITORING AND THE
FUTURE OF CERCLA: Reinvigorating the
Superfund Law's Consequentialist Purpose
Colin Crawford
I. INTRODUCTION
There is little doubt that Congress will amend our nation's hazardous
waste laws and regulations in the next few years, perhaps drastically. The Fall
1994 Republican ascendancy was not the only sign of widespread
dissatisfaction with the federal hazardous waste management structure, which
includes the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA") 1 and
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act,
of 1980 ("CERCLA"). 2 Well before Representative and later House Speaker
Newt Gingrich became Washington's squeakiest wheel, demand for reform of
the nation's hazardous waste legislation-and particularly CERCLA-rang out
from several quarters, including industry, 3 the environmental lobby, 4 and
* Instructor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Research for this article was supported with a
grant from the Brooklyn Law School Faculty Fund. I am most grateful to Susie Chovev, Brooklyn
Law School Class of 1997, for her dedicated research assistance. I would also like to thank Michael
Harper, Senior Articles Editor for the Arizona State Law Journal, for his thoughtful editorial
suggestions.
1. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1976)
("RCRA").
2. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1980) ("CERCLA").
3. Michael Quint, For Insurers, a 'Black Hole'Looms, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1994, at DI;
Charlotte Allen, Superfund Toxic Problems Require More Than a Quick Fix, BARRON'S, Sept. 12,
1994, at 62 (commenting on various Superfund problems, including CERCLA's inability to direct
speedy cleanups due to litigation, and criticizing President Clinton's proposed reforms for failing to
address these problems); Mary B. Regan & Stephen H. Wildstrom, Can Clinton Clean Up the
Superfund Morass?, BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 14, 1994, at 41 (stating that "[tlhe current program is a
disaster for American businesses"); Superfund Said to Cause Credit Crunch, SUPEtFUND WEEK,
Aug. 6, 1993, available in 1993 WL 2761429 (discussing the costs CERCLA claims create for
small businesses-as distinct from those imposed on other potentially responsible parties ("PRPs")-
and focusing in particular on small businesses' inability to obtain credit, expand or maintain
operations); CMA Idea: Let an ALJ Allocate Liability, SUPERFUND WEEK, Aug. 20, 1993,
available in 1993 WL 2761368 (Chemical Manufacturers Association representative calls for an end
to CERCLA's joint and several liability provisions); Chris Roush, The Hurricane Called Superfund,
BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 2, 1993, at 74 ("Clearly, one of the major threats to the solvency of
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government. 5  Thus, the Republican's return to congressional power only
helped focus the angry call to reform the laws now widely perceived as unduly
punitive and over-inclusive in their regulatory scope.
6
Criticisms of CERCLA's approach to hazardous waste management
often boil down to a single concern: fairness. People with different political
philosophies and divergent views on the appropriate role of environmental
protection nonetheless often agree that various CERCLA provisions, and in
particular its imposition of joint and several liability, are unjust in practice.7
property and casualty insurers is the risk of contract reinterpretation that could impose enormous
unforeseen environmental clean-up costs."); James Picerno, Rulings on Clean-Ups Take a Fresh
Turn, BARRON'S, Jan. 4, 1993, at 45 (reporting recent cases that take a restrictive approach to
interpreting CERCLA).
4. See, e.g., Hearing Frenzy Hits House; Closure Sought on Retroactive Liability Issue,
HAZARDOUS WASTE NEWS, June 26, 1995, available in 1995 WL 2407302 (environmental
lobbyists call for the repeal of retroactive liability as applied to certain municipalities); John H.
Cushman, Jr., Congress Forgoes Its Bid to Hasten Cleanup of Dumps, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1994,
at Al (discussing failed Clinton Administration CERCLA reform proposal, and noting comments
of, inter alia, Environmental Defense Fund legislative director William J. Roberts who stated that
the proposed "revision was 'far from perfect' [but] it would have been a substantial improvement
over the status quo").
5. See Congress, Industry, Regulators Gearing up for Head Start on Upcoming
Reauthorization, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1579, 1580 (Oct. 16, 1992) (reporting on Randolph W.
Deitz, counsel for the House Public Works & Transportation Subcommittee on Investigations and
Oversight, and his opinion that CERCLA's liability scheme is unfair); United States Envtl.
Protection Agency, EPA Policy Guidance Document: Guidance on CERCL4 Settlements with De
Micromis Waste Contributors, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 35,566, 35,567 (July 30, 1993)
[hereinafter EPA Guidance] ("We believe that the contribution demands and several recent third-
party suits against parties that could qualify for a de micromis settlement produce inequitable
burdens (e.g., increased litigation expenses and transaction costs) for these parties."); Municipal
Concerns Dominate Reauthorization, SUPERFUND WEEK, Mar. 19, 1993, available in 1993 WL
2761752; EPA Skewered on Risk Assessment During Superfund Reform Hearing, NUCLEAR WASTE
NEWS, Mar. 31, 1994, available in 1994 WL 2521033 (Senate Energy & Natural Resources
Committee's Chairman Johnston (D.-La.) questions EPA's standards for developing clean-up levels
under CERCLA); Hill Leaders: Superfund to Get Complete Change, SUPERFUND WEEK, Mar. 31,
1995, available in 1995 WL 7504161 [hereinafter Hill Leaders] (reporting on discussions between
Senators and local government officials regarding Superfund problems); Robert Tomsho, Pollution
Ploy: Big Corporations Hit By Superfund Cases Find Way to Share Bill, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2,
1991, at Al ("'The private sector is using its many years of experience with this statute to hit the
unknowing, little-trained cities in the pocketbook,' grumbles Kevin Murphy, city manager of
Alhambra, California.").
6. See, e.g., MICHAEL B. GERRARD, WHOSE BACKYARD, WHOSE RISK 84 (1994)
(observing that the fairness principles in CERCLA and state siting legislation "are irreconcilable
with each other and with important other values"); Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Superfund,
Recycling & Solid Waste Management of the Senate Comm. on Env't & Public Works, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1993) (opening statement of Hon. David Durenberger) (noting "the complaint . .. that
Superfund cleanups go beyond what is necessary to protect health and environment").
7. See, e.g., Hon. James L. Oakes, Developments in Environmental Law: What to Watch,
25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,308 (June 1995) (noting the widespread criticism of
CERCLA's retroactive, joint and several liability scheme); John E. Osborn & Steven N. Williams,
840
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The joint and several liability provisions received the fiercest criticism because
they potentially impose liability on both the people and/or entities who created
hazardous waste contamination as well as successor owners or operators who
did not. 8 The news was full of stories of people who unknowingly purchased
land contaminated by hazardous waste many years earlier, and whose efforts to
comply with government orders (issued under authority from CERCLA) to
clean-up the toxic mess left them nearly bankrupt. 9 Revisions to CERCLA in
1986, notably the inclusion of an "innocent landowner" defense, did little to
alleviate the continuing concern that the weight of the statute often falls heavily
on the unsuspecting. 0  Indeed, most people who have even a limited
knowledge of CERCLA and the Superfund I process have heard stories about
Reauthorizing Superfund: Problems and Prospects, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 29, 1994, at 1; Small Business
Representatives Detail Retroactive Liability Problems for Panel, 1995 DER 61, Mar. 30, 1995, at
d53.
The scope of CERCLA's liability scheme has also received criticism, particularly because
it extends to transporters of hazardous waste. See, e.g., Superfund: Draft Language for Reform Bill
Would Exempt Waste Generators, Transporters From Liability, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2101 (Mar. 8,
1996). More recently, CERCLA critics have focused on the so-called "orphan" share-those
parties in CERCLA cleanups who are bankrupt or otherwise unable to pay their share of the costs.
William D. Evans, Jr., The Phantom PRP in CERCLA Contribution Litigation: EPA to the Rescue?,
26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2109, 2109-17 (Mar. 8, 1996) (suggesting that courts increasingly shy away
from imposing strict joint and several liability even though warranted by the facts of the case).
8. The attacked provisions appear at 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)-(b) (1988) and 42 U.S.C. §
9607(e)(2) (1988). In addition to the materials cited in previous footnotes, see also United States v.
Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
9. One example is the story of a man who retired from his Michigan manufacturing job and
bought 70 acres of land near his West Virginia birthplace. The land, which was purchased without
an attorney or title search, was once used as a dump. After conducting an inspection in 1983, the
EPA directed that the man clean up the property, at an estimated cost of $800,000. 22 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 977, 978.
In California, a "distinctly non-wealthy couple" had the misfortune of purchasing a small
house in rural Northern California located on land contaminated by potentially lethal polychlorinated
biphenyls, or "PCBs." The couple, who could not afford to pay the $20,000 clean-up price, was
fined $25,000 a day by the state for their inaction. After much protest, the state lifted the fine, but
not the clean-up bill. Joanne Lipman, Unwitting Owners May Owe For Cleanup of Toxic Waste,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 1984, § 2, at 27.
10. The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA") modified
CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1986). The innocent landowner defense appears at 42 U.S.C. §
9601(35) (1986). For discussion of the provision's limitations, see Diane H. Nowak, Comment,
CERCLA's Innocent Landowner Defense: The Rising Standard of Environmental Due Diligence for
Real Estate Transactions, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 827 (1990); Ginamarie Alvino, Landowner Liability
Under CERCLA: Is Innocence a Defense?, 4 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 149, 179 (1989).
11. Although the entire Act is commonly called the "Superfund law," the Superfund is
actually only one aspect of the hazardous waste contamination clean-up statute. The Superfund is
paid for by a tax on petroleum and various other polluting substances, and underwrites the cleanup
of only the most serious environmental hazards. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9611, 9631(a)-(b)(1), 9641(a)-
(b) (1986); 26 U.S.C. § 4681 (1989).
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CERCLA's "innocent victims," such as the saga of an excavation company
roped into a CERCLA clean-up action after it "moved contaminated soil from
one spot in a parcel to another uncontaminated spot of the same parcel" while
performing its duties as a contractor hired to prepare the site for
development. 12  To render these appalling situations tragicomic, such parties
even receive a special moniker because of their tiny but nonetheless real
responsibility to participate in a toxic waste cleanup under CERCLA: They are
not merely "de minimus" parties;'
3 they are "de micromis" parties. 14
In light of this situation, it is not surprising that dissatisfaction-and
often disgust-with CERCLA is widespread. Statutory reform (and not merely
funding reauthorization for the Superfund) appears certain, although the
congressional budget deadlock and election year politics will likely delay
definitive action. However, while most agree that CERCLA should be
reformed, reformers must be careful not to scrap the statute's real
achievements. This Article argues that in the course of reforming CERCLA,
and in particular its weakest and most unclear provisions, legislators should
review the statute's original purposes. 16  Despite the unfair results CERCLAgenerates in some circumstances, the Act's central goals remain laudable.
12. James R. Adams, Contractor Who Moves Soil Subject to CERCLA Liability, 60 DEF.
COUNS. J. 604, 604 (1993). The case was litigated in Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v.
Catellus Dev., 976 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1992).
13. A "de minimus" contributor is liable for costs of responding to a CERCLA cleanup.
However, since the passage of SARA in 1986, some parties, by virtue of their circumstances, may
receive favorable treatment in the clean-up cost allocation settlement. See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)
(1986). For example, a real property owner of a site on which a facility was located who neither
conducted nor permitted "the generation, transportation, storage, treatment, or disposal of any
hazardous substance at the facility," may receive special treatment. See id. Given the cost of many
CERCLA cleanups, the total expense borne by consolidated "de minimus" parties can be
substantial. See, e.g., Superfund: Federal Agencies To Pick Up Bulk of Tab in $60 Million Landfill
Clean-up Settlement, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 559 (July 14, 1995) ("Under a second agreement filed in
the same court, about 340 de minimus settlors, including state and federal agencies, private
companies, and numerous universities and medical facilities, agreed to pay an additional $8.5
million toward past and future clean-up costs, according to DOJ.").
14. Nancy Kaplan, CERCLA Cleanup Bill is Headed for Reauthorization-And Repair,
MASS. LAW. WKLY., May 23, 1994, at 38; EPA Guidance, supra note 5, at 35,566.
15. John H. Cushman, Jr., Program to Clean Toxic Waste Sites Is Left In Turmoil, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 1996, at Al; Ridgway M. Hall, Jr., What Will Superfund Reauthorization Look
Like?, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 236 (May 19, 1995); John H. Cushman, Jr., G.O.P. To Start From
Scratch In Revising Toxic Dump Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1995, at A19.
16. Legislators must also recognize that:
In fact, the practice of environmental law demands even stronger regard for the
public interest than does securities or banking practice. Environmental statutes
are motivated by a broad need to protect the public, often from harms that may
not be immediate but are far-reaching in their ability to disrupt and destroy.
J. William Futrell, Environmental Ethics, Legal Ethics, and Codes of Professional Responsibility,
27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 825, 837 (1994).
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Although unfair elements of the statute unquestionably require drastic revision,
it is also true that the continuing need for safe, effective hazardous waste
cleanup is more urgent than ever, as is the related need to identify the
populations at greatest risk of harm from such waste.1 7  Thus, appropriate
CERCLA reform will restrict the Act's liability scheme but expand its overall
scope. Congress should not lose sight of the fact that CERCLA is, first and•18
foremost, a statute designed to protect the public health and the environment.
The Article advances these views in three main parts. Part II gives a
brief overview of the reasons why most of the legal and transactional time,
attention, and money spent during CERCLA's first fifteen years focused on
who should pay for hazardous waste cleanup, and how much parties should pay
once identified. The section briefly examines some of the understandable
reasons why this occurred, but then argues that a revised CERCLA will be
more effective if it concentrates instead on what costs should be covered. Part
II concludes by demonstrating that such a re-focus would reflect CERCLA's
original, radically consequentialist design. Part III of the Article concentrates
on the appropriateness of drafting explicit provisions for one of those
"whats"-namely medical monitoring of hazardous waste cleanups. Given that
much of the debate over CERCLA reform now centers on the need to set
priorities and determine the extent of possible environmental harm, Part III
argues that medical monitoring provides an especially appealing way to serve
two functions, namely protecting human health and the environment from toxic
harms and amassing reliable scientific information to plan future hazardous
waste cleanups. The Article then briefly examines two opposing lines of cases
that consider the medical monitoring issue, isolating what these cases say about
environmental law and policy-making, and concludes that the pro-medical
monitoring cases have the better argument. Part IV considers justifications for,
and difficulties raised by, a pro-medical monitoring approach. The section
17. Notable examples are poor racial and ethnic minority populations. See Commission for
Racial Justice, United Church of Christ, Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States: A National
Report on the Racial and Socio-Economic Characteristics of Communities with Hazardous Waste
Sites (New York: United Church of Christ, 1987). This study was updated in 1994. Benjamin A.
Goldman & Laura Fitton, Toxic Wastes and Race Revisited: An Update of the 1987 Report on the
Racial and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Communities With Hazardous Waste Sites (Center for
Policy Alternatives, 1994).
Preliminary analysis of future risks from present hazardous waste sites appear in James T.
Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, Human Health Risk Assessments for Superfund, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q.
573 (1994).
18. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1986) ("Whenever . . . any hazardous substance is
released or there is a substantial threat of such a release into the environment . . . the President is
authorized to act . . . or take any other response measure . . . which the President deems necessary
to protect the public health or welfare or the environment.").
28:8391
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concludes that the potential advantages of incorporating medical monitoring
provisions into CERCLA outweigh the concerns raised by such a plan.
II. CERCLA'S FIRST 15 YEARS: WHO WILL PAY?
Since the Act's inception, questions of who will pay for hazardous
waste cleanups have dominated CERCLA litigation. 19 This is not entirely
surprising. CERCLA is notorious for having been rushed through the 96th
Congress in the last days of Jimmy Carter's presidency. As a result, some of
its provisions are frustratingly vague, and the intentions of its drafters remain
unclear. 21 This is especially true with respect to its strict, retroactive liability
provisions, which target a wide range of persons as potentially "responsible"
for CERCLA cleanup.22 Thus, litigation over who is a responsible party23 for
purposes of clean-up cost liability has concentrated, for example, on what
19. See, e.g., ALLAN TOPOL & REBECCA SNOW, SUPERFUND LAW AND PROCEDURE 165
(1992); PATTON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK (BNA) 348 (1994) ("Disputes will
often arise which threaten to drive group members to litigate against one another. In order to
prevent wasteful litigation, PRP agreements have made use of dispute resolution clauses with
increased frequency.") See also id. at 345 ("CERCLA has spawned a great deal of litigation in
recent years both among private parties and between private parties and the government. However,
nearly everyone in the Superfund process has come to realize that the costs of Superfund litigation
in terms of wasted resources and clean-up delays can outweigh the benefits of litigation."); Andrew
H. Perellis & Mary E. Doohan, Superfund Litigation: The Elements and Scope of Liability, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 1, 21 (Janet S. Kole & Larry D. Espel eds., 1991) ("Although
CERCLA was enacted over a decade ago, litigation continues at a brisk pace. The scope of liability
continues to be defined through litigation. Moreover, the 1990s are likely to experience an increase
in private party CERCLA actions, particularly those seeking to allocate liability among PRPs.").
20. See, e.g., PETER S. MENELL & RICHARD B. STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY 614 (1994); Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1233, 1246 n.16 (M.D. Pa. 1990)
("Because of its varied and extensive record of passage, the use of CERCLA's legislative history
has its limits.").
21. This is a point commentators seldom fail to mention. See, e.g., GERALD W. BOSTON &
M. STUART MADDEN, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND TOXIC TORTS: CASES, MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS 475 (1994) (noting that "the legislative history of CERCLA . . . is not a paragon of
clarity..."); SUSAN M. COOKE, THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: MANAGEMENT, CLEANUP,
LIABILITY AND LITIGATION §§ 12.01[1] & 12.0211] (1993).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
23. The Act does not define "responsible party." However, it does define "covered persons"
for purposes of establishing liability. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). "Responsible person" is
mentioned in 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(2), with respect to "Itihe liability of an owner or operator or
other responsible person under this section . . . ." Courts have used the terms "responsible party"
or "potentially responsible parties" ("PRPs") as a shorthand for the "covered persons" provision.
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constitutes "transport" of hazardous materials, 24 and who qualifies as an
"owner" or "operator" for purposes of CERCLA liability. 25
As a result of this litigation, one tends to lose sight of the statute's
26original purpose: protecting human health and the environment. It is
important to remember that the statute's confusions derive in part from the fact
that it was drafted in the waning days of the Carter presidency, and in
somewhat of a crisis situation. CERCLA became law shortly after, and partly
in response to, the disaster at Love Canal, New York, in which 240 families
abandoned their homes because of contamination caused by years of toxic
dumping by oil companies-contamination so severe that it had demonstrable
effects on residents' health.
27
From the beginning, CERCLA's drafters struggled with questions of
fairness. This is seen most evidently in the Act's ingenious solutions to the
most serious environmental clean-up problems, such as its financing of the
Superfund by taxes on heavily polluting industries. 18  Thus, at its inception,CERCLA aimed to force polluting industries to internalize their externalities.29
24. For one discussion of what constitutes "transport," see Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical
Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1992).
25. On the issue of who is an "owner" or "operator," see Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper
& Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 940 (1992).
26. CERCLA is described as "[a]n Act to provide for liability, compensation, cleanup, and
emergency response for hazardous substances released into the environment and the cleanup of
inactive hazardous waste disposal sites." Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980).
Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial
threat of such a release into the environment, or (B) there is a release or
substantial threat of release into the environment of any pollutant or
contaminant which may present an imminent and substantial danger to the
public health or welfare, the President is authorized to act ....
42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1986).
27. See, e.g., Charles Lee, Beyond Toxic Wastes and Race, in CONFRONTING
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM 46-47 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1993).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) authorizes the Superfund. See also COOKE, supra note 21, §
12.01[2] ("The federal Superfund program is financed by an $8.5 billion trust fund, which derives
its revenues from taxes on crude oil, chemical feedstocks, a corporate excise tax, and general
federal revenues."). The 1986 amendment to CERCLA changed CERCLA's tax-dependent and
revenue structure somewhat. See id. at § 12.05[2][s]; WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR.,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 699-700 (2d ed. 1994).
29. The original financing plan, which adopted a "polluter pays" approach, appeared at 42
U.S.C. § 9631 (1983), repealed by SARA, § 517(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1988). See CONG.
REC. 30,932 (1980) (reporting on an early Senate version of the bill eventually passed into law as
CERCLA: "The purposes of this bill were: . . . First, to make those who release hazardous
substances strictly liable for clean-up costs, mitigation, and third-party damages. Thus, it assures
that the costs of chemical poison are borne by those responsible for the releases. . . .Fourth, the
bill would provide that the fund be financed largely by those industries and consumers who profit
from products and services associated with the hazardous substances which impose risks on
ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL
Nonetheless, concerns from the start that CERCLA unfairly punished
those responsible for the waste deviled the Act's admirable attempt to hold
those people directly responsible, thus leading to a change in the structure of
the Superfund in 1986. Complaints against CERCLA "as inherently unfair
almost since its inception" were issued in large part from the banking and
insurance industries, whose businesses were seriously threatened by the
31statute's punitive liability structure. Opposition from those industries helped
fuel an industry of CERCLA litigation. The insurance industry in particular
drummed up political support for its view that CERCLA threatened its
continued well-being.
32
Regrettably, the expenditure of so much energy on who should pay
and how much they should pay diverted attention away from one of
CERCLA's central purposes-creating the "opportunity . . . for victims to
receive prompt and adequate compensation for losses and injuries. "'33 At its
origin, the statute embodied a radically consequentialist view of environmental
law and policymaking. It recognized that the long-term effects of
environmental damage required what was then seen as a drastic solution: hold
the polluter responsible for the environmental damage he or she creates. At
least among academic lawyers and students, this notion is no longer so
contestable. Yet in practice, CERCLA's solution suffers from the
uncertainty that a polluter's activities will actually cause long-term harm.
Thus, most versions of proposed CERCLA reform concentrate on acceptable
society."). Thus, Congress focused on the petrochemical industries. See S. REP. No. 99-73, at 12
(1985).
30. The 1986 SARA amendments directed that Congress finance the now larger Superfund
with general funds. See S. REP. No. 99-73, at 13 (1985).
31. Osborn & Williams, supra note 7, at 1 n.2 (citing cases); see also Roush, supra note 3, at
74 ("What scares insurers more than the specter of another Hurricane Andrew? To any insurance
executive, the answer is easy: Superfund claims."). The homebuilders, banking, and insurance
industries' concerns with CERCLA's potential effect on their business appeared early in the statute's
history. See, e.g., Joanne Lipman, Unwitting Owners May Owe for Cleanup of Toxic Waste, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 1, 1984, § 2, at 27.
32. The cases most often cited in support of this view are United States v. Fleet Factors
Corp., 821 F. Supp. 707 (S.D. Ga. 1993) and United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F. Supp.
955 (S.D. Ga. 1988) (bank involved in management of property not entitled to CERCLA's secured
creditor exemption); Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 900
(1995).
33. CONG. REC. 30,932 (1980) (quoting Senator Jennings Randolph (D-W. Va.)).
34. See, e.g., COOKE, supra note 21, § 12.03[4][d]; LAKSHMAN D. GURUSWAMY ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 266 (1994) ("The orthodox wisdom
... is that costs should be internalized to the polluter.").
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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levels of cleanup, rather than requiring that polluters restore the site to its pre-
contaminated state.
35
Unfortunately, drafters of CERCLA reform proposals possess little
information regarding the likely consequences of relaxing clean-up standards
or delegating more authority for conducting cleanup to the states. 6  In large
part, this uncertainty stems from the fact that most of the substances now
classified as hazardous are of recent enough vintage that we do not yet know
their long-term effects.37 Therefore, in order to honor the consequentialist
drive that led to CERCLA's initial passage, CERCLA reform should include
measures that permit more informed hazardous waste cleanup. One such
revision that could "'strike a reasonable balance between the interests of the
affected communities and the interests of the business community"' is the
provision for long-term medical monitoring in CERCLA cleanups. 38
III. CERCLA AS A WORK IN PROGRESS: MEDICAL MONITORING
AND THE ACQUISITION OF GREATER CERTAINTY
Because so much of the first fifteen years of CERCLA's life was
devoted to making sense of its retroactive and strict liability provisions, most
discussion of CERCLA reform focuses on how to correct the unfair aspects of
those sections of the Act. 39 Although these are important issues, it would be a
mistake to allow such questions to dominate without also considering
CERCLA's fundamental purpose of regulating human and environmental
health. Thus, reform should also look to and reconsider the fundamental
35. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 14, at 38 (discussing President Clinton's proposal for
CERCLA reform, which emphasizes "more generic clean-up levels"); Hall, supra note 15, at 237
("the risk assessment process must be reformed to require realistic exposure scenarios to support
clean-up standards. There must be greater use of presumptively appropriate remedies without the
need for costly studies of every other conceivable remedy just because it is in the EPA cookbook.");
Superfund: CERCLA Reform Measure Introduced By Oxley; Subcommittee Divided On Provisions
Of Bill, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1095 (Oct. 20, 1995) [hereinafter CERCLA Reform Measure]
(discussing Republican-introduced reform proposals, including relaxed remedy-selection
procedures). See also Scott C. Whitney, Superfund Reform: Clarification of Clean-up Standards to
Rationalize the Remedy Selection Process, 20 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 183 (1995).
36. Delegating clean-up authority to the states is another common proposal for CERCLA
reform. See, e.g., Cushman, G.O.P. to Start . supra note 15, at A19, and Hall, supra note 15,
at 237.
37. See Our Stolen Future: Part 1, RACHEL'S ENV'T & HEALTH WKLY., # 486, Mar. 21,
1996 (discussing the disputed effects of synthetic chemicals on human and environmental health).
38. Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.), quoted in CERCLA Reform Measure, supra note 35.
39. See supra note 3.
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purposes of the statute, particularly 40 its concern with the long-term
consequences of environmental pollution.
The following example illustrates the need for such an approach. For
over twenty years, the Lipari landfill in Pitman, New Jersey, accepted
petrochemical and heavy metal wastes.41  As such, it was typical of the most
42
serious hazardous waste clean-up problems . Disposal of hazardous
substances at Lipari antedated the passage of CERCLA, making it exactly the
kind of site that the statute was designed to address. Some of the contaminated
land is currently slated for residential and commercial development, despite the
protests of those who have, for over a generation, lived and worked nearby
and claim that the landfill brought chronic health problems into their lives,
including high rates of certain cancers and other disabling, potentially fatal
conditions. 43  Prior to further land development, some of the residents are
seeking medical monitoring in an effort to determine the long-term health
effects of the landfill. 44 However, because the cost of cleanup at Lipari is
already staggeringly high-over $100 million in mid-1996-those responsible
40. As outlined, for example, in 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1986).
41. Jon Nordheimer, Residue of Fear Remains as Toxins Are Removed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6,
1994, § 1, at 3.
42. For instance, compare the following, grim assessment from CERCLA supporter, Sen.
Max Baucus:
Many of my colleagues are terribly concerned about the program. I know I
am. It's been almost 13 years since we created Superfund, but we have little to
show for our efforts. We have identified over 36,000 contaminated sites across
the country, characterized well over 90 percent of them, taken emergency
action at 3,000 of the most seriously contaminated. But beyond this, we have
not made much progress.
Some 1,200 toxic sites have been listed for long-term Superfund cleanup.
Only 150 have been cleaned up. And while work has begun at many sites,
each site is taking longer and costing more to clean up. It now takes at least 9
years for the average site to be cleaned up, at a cost of $30 million, and 15 to
30 percent of the money goes to lawyers.
Superfund Reauthorization: Hearings on Health and Ecological Impacts of Superfund Sites Before
the Subcomm. on Superfund, Recycling & Solid Waste Management of the Senate Comm. on Env't
& Public Works, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (opening statement of Hon. Max Baucus, committee
chair).
43. See Nordheimer, supra note 41, at 3; Landfill Linked to Cases of Leukemia and Low Birth
Weight, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1989, at A33; Dahir Mubarak, Why Are These Former Girl Scouts
Sick? (Toxic Waste at Summer Camp), 185 REDBOOK 92, Aug. 1995 (includes related articles on
risk factors).
44. Nordheimer, supra note 41, at 3 (discussing work of the Lipari Information Network, set
up with a grant from the EPA's Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry); Wastes and
Hazardous Substances Toxic II: NJ Residents to Document Health Histories, GREENWIRE, Feb. 1,
1995.
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for the cleanup may not welcome proposals for medical monitoring .4  When
refusing to add such costs, opponents of medical monitoring proposals can
point to a series of judicial decisions holding that CERCLA does not cover
medical monitoring costs.
46
However, the arguments against including the costs of medical
monitoring in CERCLA cleanups suffer from a common misconception: they
conflate medical monitoring with medical treatment.47  Operating under this
conceptual confusion, courts rejected monitoring by classifying it as a form of
48personal loss recovery . However, a close inspection renders the analysis
unsupportable. When "medical monitoring" is correctly understood as a series
of controlled, regularly administered tests of body fluids, tissues, and functions
to determine the consequences of hazardous waste exposure and contamination
upon human health and mortality, it is easily viewed as not only a valuable and
useful aspect of a CERCLA cleanup, but also a cost fully contemplated by
CERCLA's designated purpose of protecting human health and theS 49
environment. Under this reading of the Act, subsequent claims for medical
treatment might be possible in tort, based in part on information gathered
during the medical monitoring process. Increasingly, the potential of such
"environmental torts" has been recognized. 5°
45. The discovery of additional, previously unknown contamination in early 1996 will likely
escalate clean-up costs further. #1 Superfund Site Gets Worse, 7 ENVTL. LABORATORY WASH.
REP. 5 (1996); More Pollution Found at Worst Superfund Site, THE RECORD, Feb. 15, 1996, at A9.
46. See, e.g., Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527 (10th Cir. 1992); Cook v. Rockwell
Int'l Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1468 (D. Colo. 1991); Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1233
(M.D. Pa. 1990); Coburn v. Sun Chemical Corp., 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1665 (E.D. Pa.
1988). See also supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
47. The views outlined in this paragraph are discussed in greater depth in Colin Crawford,
Strategies for Environmental Justice: Rethinking CERCLA Medical Monitoring Lawsuits, 74 B.U.
L. REV. 267 (1994). See also Kristin Elizabeth Sweeney, Note, Daigle v. Shell Oil Company and
the Bumpy Road to the Recoverability of Medical Monitoring Expenses Under CERCL4, 47 VAND.
L. REV. 235 (1994); Kathryn E. Hand, Comment, Someone to Watch Over Me: Medical Monitoring
Costs Under CERCLA, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 363 (1994); Amy B. Blumenberg, Note,
Medical Monitoring Funds: The Periodic Payment of Future Medical Surveillance Expenses in Toxic
Exposure Litigation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 661 (1992); Dan A. Tanenbaum, Comment, When Does
Going to the Doctor Serve the Public Health? Medical Monitoring Response Costs Under CERCLA,
59 U. CHI. L. REV. 925, 929 (1992); Allan T. Slagel, Note, Medical Surveillance Damages: A
Solution to the Inadequate Compensation of Toxic Tort Victims, 63 IND. L.J. 849 (1988); John J.
Kalas, Medical Surveillance Damages in Toxic Tort Litigation: A Half-Hearted Embrace, U. BALT.
J. ENVTL. L. 126, 132 (1992). But see George W.C. McCarter, Medical Sue-veillance: A History
and Critique of the Medical Monitoring Remedy in Toxic Tort Litigation, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 227
(1993).
48. See sources cited id.
49. See supra note 6.
50. See, e.g., Troyen A. Brennan, Environmental Torts, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1, 62-71 (1993).
See also Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 158-74 (1992); In re Paoli
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The view that CERCLA does not encompass medical monitoring costs
gained prominence in the federal courts following the decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Daigle v. Shell Oil Co.
51
Daigle was the first circuit court decision addressing CERCLA and medical
monitoring, and followed a series of decisions in which federal district courts
52divided on the issue. The split in case law is particularly interesting because
it reveals fundamentally different approaches to environmental law and
policymaking. On the one hand, the now-majority view, most notably as
articulated in the Daigle line of cases, takes a "slippery slope" approach as
courts fear that allowing medical monitoring would transform CERCLA into a
general toxic tort recovery statute.53  On the other hand, the federal district
courts that endorse the use of medical monitoring under CERCLA seem more
dedicated to serving the statute's original, consequentialist purpose of
protecting human health and the environment5 4
Interestingly, both approaches follow a similar rhetorical pattern. In
both lines of cases, the courts engage in a "plain meaning" statutory analysis
that they find supports their respective positions .5  Both note that CERCLA
encompasses "monitoring," although the Daigle line of cases reject the view
R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 849-51 (3d Cir. 1990). In re Paoli reinstates a medical
monitoring test under Pennsylvania state law and observes that:
[Tihe damages available in a medical monitoring claim-the costs of the tests-
are not likely to be high enough to provoke a flood of litigation. We predict
that Pennsylvania would not want to make the cost of bringing a medical
monitoring claim so high (by requiring extensive study of the particular
plaintiff) that it would never be worthwhile to bring such a claim.
In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 788 (3d Cir. 1994).
51. 972 F.2d 1527 (10th Cir. 1992).
52. For the cases disallowing medical monitoring costs, see supra note 46. The principal
case suggesting that medical monitoring costs may be recoverable under CERCLA is Brewer v.
Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176, 1179 (M.D. Tenn. 1988). See also Williams v. Allied Automotive,
Autolite Div., 704 F. Supp. 782, 784 (N.D. Ohio 1988); United States v. Conservation Chemical
Co., 628 F. Supp. 391, 408 (W.D. Mo. 1985); Adams v. Republic Steel Corp., 621 F. Supp. 370,
376 (W.D. Tenn. 1985); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co., 579 F.
Supp. 823, 852 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1429 (S.D. Ohio
1984); State ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1316 (N.D. Ohio 1983). A brief
summary of the relevant cases appears at Robert A. Mullins, The Aftermath of Key Tronic:
Implications for Attorney's Fee Awards, 24 ENVTL. L. 1513, 1522 nn.44-47 (1994). The author's
analysis of these cases appears in Crawford, supra note 47, at 303-24.
53. See, e.g., Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1233, 1238 (M.D. Pa. 1990).
54. See, e.g., Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1179.
55. See, e.g., Coburn v. Sun Chemical Corp., 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1665, 1671 (E.D.
Pa. 1988) (finding that the statute's "plain meaning" disallowed medical monitoring); Brewer, 680
F. Supp. at 1179 (reviewing the statutory language and finding that because "[p]ublic health related
medical tests and screening clearly are necessary to 'monitor, assess, tor] evaluate a release,' [they]
constitute 'removal' under [CERCLA] section 9601(23)").
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that this includes "medical" monitoring.56 In other words, the Daigle line of
cases takes an analytical approach to statutory interpretation that can be
classified as "glass half empty" analysis: because CERCLA's monitoring
definition does not say "medical monitoring," such costs are disallowed.57 By
contrast, the opposing line of cases-the minority view-takes an analytical
approach to the issue that can be classified as "glass half full" analysis: the
mere fact that the Act's language does not specifically include medical
monitoring does not support the conclusion that such costs are not covered in a
CERCLA clean-up action. 58 Moreover, courts on both sides of the issue refer
to CERCLA's notoriously unreliable legislative history as supporting their
respective views.
59
A. The Majority View: CERCLA Does Not Cover
Medical Monitoring Costs
Daigle considered questions arising out of the cleanup at the Rocky
Mountain Arsenal, a federally-controlled CERCLA site outside Denver,
Colorado. 6° The plaintiff class consisted of people residing near the Arsenal
who sought an award of monitoring costs. Although the Court of Appeals
acknowledged the increasing requests for medical monitoring, "given the latent
nature of many diseases caused by exposure to hazardous materials and the
traditional common law tort doctrine requirement that an injury be manifest,"
it nevertheless held that CERCLA does not permit recovery for medical
monitoring costs.
62
Moreover, the Daigle court refused to afford "a broad sweep to the
'public health and welfare' language in [CERCLA's] definitions," and
concluded that while "[m]edical monitoring would mitigate the potential
individual health problems of Plaintiffs .... [CERCLA does not contemplate]
the general provision for prevention or mitigation of 'damage to public health
56. See supra note 46.
57. Thus, Daigle relied heavily upon the canon of statutory construction known as ejusdem
generis. 972 F.2d at 1535.
58. See, e.g., Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1179.
59. See, e.g., Ambrogi, 750 F. Supp. at 1246 n. 16 (using CERCLA's legislative history as
support for the conclusion that the Act does not cover monitoring costs). But see Daigle, 972 F.2d
at 1535 (admitting that CERCLA's legislative history is "sparse"); Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1179
(citing Chaplin v. Exxon Corp., 25 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2009, 2011-12 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (using
CERCLA's legislative history as support for the conclusion that the Act covers medical monitoring
costs)).
60. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1530.
61. Id. at 1532.
62. Id. at 1533, 1535 (citing In re Paoli, 916 F.2d at 849).
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or welfare."' 63  Thus, by describing medical monitoring as a means to
"mitigate" individual health problems, Daigle furthered a notional blurring
between treatment and monitoring. 64  In so ruling, the Daigle court ignored
CERCLA's plain language, which allows for clean-up actions that, inter alia,
"monitor, assess and evaluate" releases of hazardous substances, as well as
measures designed to help forestall a release of hazardous waste, or the threat
65of one.
A number of courts adopted Daigle's view that CERCLA does not
encompass medical monitoring, including another Tenth Circuit case66 and
three decisions from other federal courts of appeals. This trend appears to
cement the judicial rejection of medical monitoring costs as compensable
CERCLA clean-up expenses. The first major post-Daigle medical monitoring
case was Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army. Redland
Soccer Club considered the consolidated claims of several classes of plaintiffs
68
who sought medical monitoring for injuries-including lymphocytic leukemia,
69enlarged lymph nodes and other, undefined illnesses -that may have resulted
from exposure to toxic substances at the former Army landfill .7 The court
rejected plaintiffs' claims under CERCLA.71  Interestingly, although decided
nearly three years after Daigle, Redland Soccer Club made no mention of the
Tenth Circuit's decision, and looked instead to a line of federal district court
cases rejecting medical monitoring claims on narrower grounds, specifically
CERCLA's requirement that parties must incur some "costs of response" prior
72to filing a claim. Therefore, the Redland Soccer Club court declared, "we
63. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535.
64. The Daigle court adopted this reasoning from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania's decision in Coburn v. Sun Chemical Corp., 28 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1665 (E.D. Pa. 1988). Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1986); see also 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1986) ("'remedial action'
means those actions . . . to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances so that they do
not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future health or welfare or the environment.
The term includes, but is not limited to . . . any monitoring reasonably required to assure that such
actions protect the public health and welfare and the environment.").
66. Satsky v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 7 F.3d 1464, 1469 (10th Cir. 1993)
(monitoring costs sought against operator of mine disallowed under Daigle as a form of private
economic damages).
67. 55 F.3d 827 (3d Cir. 1995).
68. Including: (1) workers who converted land formerly used as a United States Army depot
where toxic waste had been deposited into a soccer field; (2) residents who lived near the
depot/landfill; and (3) children and teenagers who played soccer on the land. Id. at 833, 837-39.
69. Id. at 839.
70. Id. at 834-43.
71. Id. at 849-50.
72. Id. at 850 (citing, inter alia, Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1468, 1476 (D.
Colo. 1991) and Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1233, 1246 (M.D. Pa. 1990)).
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do not believe that the district court erred in determining that plaintiffs' costs
are not response costs because they are not 'monies . . .expended to clean up
sites or to prevent further releases of hazardous chemicals.' 73  Thus, the
Third Circuit implicitly questioned Daigle's extreme position, which conflates
medical monitoring and treatment.74 Because the Redland Soccer Club court
did not use "monitoring" and "treatment" synonymously, presumably under its
decision any monitoring expense classifiable as a clean-up cost or a means to
contain further hazardous chemical releases would pass muster for inclusion in
a CERCLA clean-up plan.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit embraced
Daigle with more enthusiasm. In two cases involving demands from people
who lived and worked near hazardous materials landfills, the Ninth Circuit
adopted Daigle's reading of CERCLA.75 Like Daigle, the Ninth Circuit
panels perfunctorily noted that "CERCLA provides elsewhere an elaborate
scheme to assess health effects of threatened hazardous substance releases."
76
The court referred specifically to the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry (ATSDR), "which is authorized to conduct health assessments, and, if
necessary, further pilot studies and a continuous program of medical
73. Redland Soccer Club, 55 F.3d at 850 (quoting Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department
of Army, 801 F. Supp. 1432, 1435 (M.D. Pa. 1992)).
74. Elsewhere in the opinion, the court demonstrated some sympathy for the medical
monitoring requests:
We do not believe ... that the Redland [Federal Tort Claims Act] Plaintiffs'
failure to produce evidence, in the form of blood or tissue tests, showing
directly that they absorbed toxins from the field into their bodies is fatal to
their claims. Defendants' own expert stated generally that there are no medical
tests which could have detected the presence of toxins found at the Park, and
even if a test existed which could have detected a particular toxin, it would
have been useful only if it were conducted within one hundred twenty days of
the plaintiffs' exposure. Requiring a plaintiff to produce this kind of evidence
to support a finding of exposure to a toxic hazard would place an impossible
burden on persons subjected to serious medical risk from toxic substances
polluters have left to contaminate the environment and afflict the people who
live near the wrongdoer's waste deposits.
Redland Soccer Club, 55 F.3d at 847 (citation omitted). The court went on to suggest that the
plaintiffs' lack of success may have resulted from the kinds of proof offered by plaintiffs in support
of their claims: "Surprisingly, we discover the record has no expert opinion on whether either [of
two plaintiff classes] have been exposed to toxins to such an extent that they suffer such an
increased risk of contracting a serious disease that supplemental medical testing is reasonably
required." Id.
75. Price v. United States Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 1994) (suit by property owner
of land formerly used as a dump for waste containing heavy metals and asbestos); Durfey v. E.I.
DuPont De Nemours Co., 59 F.3d 121, 125 (9th Cir. 1995) (lawsuit brought by parties claiming
personal injury from government-owned and contractor-operated plutonium production facility).
76. Price, 39 F.3d at 1017. Criticism of the woefully under-funded and therefore largely
ineffectual ATSDR appears in Crawford, supra note 47, at 297, 316-17, and sources cited therein.
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monitoring in appropriate cases. . . . Congress provided for the funding of
ATSDR studies separate from the payment of response costs. Therefore, the
Daigle court refused to allow plaintiffs' claims for medical monitoring
costs." 7  It bears noting that the Ninth Circuit panels advanced these views
despite the Durfey court's recognition that "[t]o date, ATSDR has yet to
undertake any medical monitoring activities anywhere in the country."78 That
the Durfey court recognized this fact is especially important because, despite
that court's conclusion that "CERCLA contains no reference to recovering
personal medical expenses," 79 the fact that "the government is able to recover
costs incurred by the ATSDR under a separate cause of action" is one of the
factors the Durfey court relied upon in concluding that "it is clear that medical
monitoring costs are not 'response' costs under CERCLA." 80 The flaw in the
court's logic is easily identifiable: the existence of a government agency-the
ATSDR-proves nothing about the availability of a separate cause of action for
medical monitoring as part of a private CERCLA cleanup. Thus, courts
appear eager to adopt uncritically the Daigle approach, without scrutinizing its
subtle collapsing of the distinction between monitoring and treatment. 8' A
number of other federal district courts have also endorsed the Daigle
approach.
82
77. Price, 39 F.3d at 1017 (citing Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1536-37); see Durfey, 59 F.3d at 125
(citing Price).
78. Durfey, 59 F.3d at 125 n.5.
79. Id. at 125.
80. Id.
81. Two closely-related cases also deserve mention. See Hanford Downwinders Coalition,
Inc. v. Dowdle, 71 F.3d 1469, 1483 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting request of citizens' coalition to have
ATSDR commence health surveillance program downwind of the Hanford plutonium production
facility); Columbia River United v. Dowdle, No. 94-35242, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 2261 (9th Cir.
Jan. 23, 1996) (affirming district court "dismissal for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to this court's
recent opinion in Hanford Downwinders Coalition, Inc. v. Dowdle, a companion appeal which
raised identical issues") (citation omitted). Hanford Downwinders distinguished between "health
assessment and surveillance actions engaged in by a governmental agency pursuant to explicit
CERCLA provisions" and "private efforts to monitor the public health." See 71 F.3d at 1477-78.
In the view of the Hanford Downwinders court, the former form of monitoring was permissible,
while the latter was not. Id. at 1479.
82. See, e.g., United States v. Ekotek, Inc., No. 2:95 CV 0154K, 1995 WL 580079, at *8-9
(D. Utah Sept. 11, 1995); Frys v. General Motors Corp., No. 93-CV-924A, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7155, at *11-12 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1995); Murray v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 867 F.
Supp. 33, 46 (D. Me. 1994); Yslava v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 845 F. Supp. 705, 708 (D. Ariz.
1993).
The Ekotek decision is of special interest because while paying superficial homage to
Daigle with respect to recovery of medical expenses, it nonetheless finds that plaintiff United States
might be entitled to medical expenses. See Ekotek, 1995 WL 580079, at *8-9. The court
distinguishes Daigle on the grounds that, unlike the facts presented in Daigle, "[in the present case,
the oversight costs were not incurred long after the threatened release of contaminants, but were
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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B. The Minority View: CERCLA Allows Recovery
of Medical Monitoring Costs
A central argument advanced by courts adopting the majority view
that CERCLA makes no allowance for recovery of medical monitoring costs
(both before and after Daigle) is that CERCLA need not cover such costs
because they are compensable through state tort causes of action.83  This
position is of interest for at least two reasons. First, it suggests some
uneasiness about the harsh result of reading CERCLA as precluding recovery
of medical monitoring costs except in the rare circumstance that the entity
conducting the cleanup is the government in the form of the ATSDR. Courts
seem eager to hold that even though CERCLA does not cover such costs, other
causes of action might. Second, it demonstrates the continuing post-Daigle
failure to distinguish between monitoring and treatment. For example, the
Redland Soccer Club court focused "on an issue we believe is central in all
toxic tort cases; namely, the requirement that the alleged wrong create some
significant risk of harm to the plaintiff. Thus, a plaintiff must not only show
exposure, but must prove that he was exposed beYond what would normally be
encountered by a person in everyday life ... "
actively incurred by the EPA during or closely in connection with the containment effort to restrict
the public's exposure to the materials at the Ekotek site," and denied defendant's motion to dismiss
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Id. at *9. Importantly, Ekotek followed not only the public
distinction set forth by the Hanford Downwinders court, discussed supra note 81, but also read
Daigle as:
[Nlot a restrictive interpretation of the language of CERCLA . . . but [as
recognizing] that the damages the plaintiffs sought could not fall within
CERCLA because they were or would be incurred at a significant
chronological distance from the clean-up operations. Indeed, the [Daigle] court
recognized that 'certain monitoring costs are recoverable' under CERCLA, but
refused to allow recovery for medical monitoring occurring long after the
cleanup of the contaminants.
Ekotek, 1995 WL 580079, at *9.
83. See, e.g., Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1233, 1248 (M.D. Pa. 1990) ("In
finding that 'medical costs' are not within the scope of [CERCLA's definitions], we do not preclude
recovery . . . under traditional state tort proceedings for personal injury. Moreover, state courts are
now recognizing 'non-traditional' torts that have developed in the common law to compensate
plaintiffs who have been exposed to various toxic substances.") (citation omitted). Daigle relied in
part upon Ambrogi. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535.
84. Redland Soccer Club, 55 F.3d at 846. See also In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916
F.2d 829, 850 (3d Cir. 1990). This is not to say that state courts do not award the costs of medical
monitoring as a form of damages when exposure to hazardous substances is demonstrated. See,
e.g., Bayardo v. Occidental Chem. Corp., No. 93-1987-D (Dist. Ct., Nueces Cty., Tex., 105th
Judicial Dist., June 30, 1995) (preliminary approval of plaintiff class personal and punitive damages
in $65.7 million settlement). The Bayardo settlement order is unpublished and difficult to obtain,
but central information about it can be obtained in State Judge Approves $65 Million Settlement
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That courts rejecting medical monitoring claims under CERCLA
emphasize such options under state law demonstrates the extent of their
conceptual confusion about CERCLA's central function. As the quoted
language from Redland Soccer Club demonstrates, courts advocating the
majority view wrongly assume that medical monitoring aims solely to recover
damages for hazardous substance exposure. However, it is possible to imagine
monitoring that instead aims only to identify the consequences of hazardous
substance exposure. Thus, monitoring could serve an invaluable diagnostic
function, a service fully consonant with CERCLA's central purposes.
Moreover, the diagnostic use of medical monitoring is consistent with some of
the most commonly agreed upon reasons for amending CERCLA, such as
reducing administrative costs and promoting more efficient results. 85  These
justifications appear to have influenced the courts adopting the minority view.
86
Unlike Daigle and other cases which disallowed recovery of medical
monitoring response costs in CERCLA clean-up actions, courts adopting the
minority view that CERCLA covers medical monitoring costs provide little
analysis in support of their position. Instead, the cases merely observe that, so
long as monitoring is used to assess the effects of released hazardous
substances on human health, CERCLA compensates such costs. 87  In short,
Against Occidental Chemical, 19 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 421 (July 14, 1995) and Texas Judge
Approves $66 Million Settlement Against Occidental Chemical in Exposure Case, 26 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 528 (July 7, 1995). See also Court Awards Medical Monitoring Costs, Attorneys' Fees in
State UST Act Decision, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1046 (Oct. 13, 1995) (ordering Shell Oil Co. and
Union Oil Co. to pay $1.5 million to clean up contaminated aquifer. The award included a
"'human health corrective action plan' for plaintiffs and their children."). But cf. Jackson v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 520 (5th Cir. 1984). Jackson is an asbestos personal injury case
holding that:
Until and unless the plaintiff develops cancer, however, the causation of cancer
has not occurred. The plaintiff is denied recovery for prospective damages
associated with cancer not because the evidence of future consequences is
insufficiently reliable, but because, as a matter of substantive law, there can be
no consequence until there is effect, and no effect without completed cause.
Id.
85. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp 1176, 1178 (M.D. Tenn. 1988) (noting that
"CERCLA's primary purpose is 'to facilitate the prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites by
placing the ultimate financial responsibility for cleanup on those responsible for the hazardous
wastes"' (quoting Walls v. Waste Resources Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318 (6th Cir. 1985))); Williams
v. Allied Automotive, Autolite Div., 704 F. Supp. 782, 784 (N.D. Ohio 1988) ("The statutory
definition of the terms 'remove' or 'removal' [which relate to expedient cleanups] clearly
contemplates such actions as are necessary to making a reasoned determination whether physical
removal of hazardous contaminants is necessary in a given situation.") (emphases added).
87. Williams, 704 F. Supp. at 784 ("Costs of medical testing falling within the statutory
definition and consistent with [federal regulations issued pursuant to CERCLA] are recoverable
response costs under CERCLA."); Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1179 ("To the extent that plaintiffs seek
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these courts implicitly recognize the qualitative difference between medical
monitoring and treatment. They also implicitly recognize that toxic tort
personal injury suits may follow the accumulation of information during a
medical monitoring period. However, unlike Daigle and similar cases, their
judgments are not result-oriented; they implicitly accept that such suits may
follow medical monitoring, and appear content to let the cards fall where they
may.
This reasoning is consistent with CERCLA's fundamental purpose
"[t]o provide for liability, compensation, cleanup, and emergency response for
hazardous substances released into the environment and the cleanup of inactive
hazardous waste disposal sites. '' 88  Moreover, it comports with reformers'
current efforts to make cleanups more cost-effective. 89  Clearly, our
understanding of the long-term health consequences of hazardous substance
exposure is imperfect. 9° Monitoring is an ideal means of gathering such
information and, crucially, information gained through the monitoring process
can be used to direct cost-effective choices during cleanup. In support of this
view, consider the following hypothetical. Suppose the Daigle court had
approved the plaintiffs' medical monitoring claims as part of the cleanup,
finding that the case was so factually undeveloped that it could not render a
to recover the cost of medical testing and screening conducted to assess the effect of the release or
discharge on public health or to identify potential public health problems presented by the release
• ..they present a cognizable claim under [CERCLA] section 9607(a)."); Jones v. Inmont Corp.,
584 F. Supp. 1425, 1429 (S.D. Ohio 1984) ("certain plaintiffs have incurred costs for medical
testing and have lost the use of wells for drinking water and farming purposes. . . .These damages
appear to meet the definition of 'removal' expressed in section 9601(23)").
88. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980).
89. In 1993, EPA Administrator Carol Browner stated that CERCLA reform proposals were
directed "toward achieving three main goals: lowering clean-up costs, expediting cleanups and
increasing community involvement." Osborn & Williams, supra note 7, at 7. Her goals are
strikingly similar to those advocated by House Speaker Newt Gingrich and fellow Republican
lawmakers two years later, who said "that they will do away with retroactive liability, institute
cost/benefit analysis and risk-prioritized cleanups and turn the program over to states and
communities." Hill Leaders, supra note 5.
90. See, e.g., RACHEL'S ENV'T & HEALTH WKLY., # 498, June 13, 1996 (reviewing
changing views of the biochemical consequences of certain chemical compounds). A recent
controversy in the popular press highlighted these uncertainties. New York Times reporter Gina
Kolata surveyed the conclusions of several scientists and concluded that industrial pollutants may
affect sperm counts. See Gina Kolata, Sperm Counts: Some Experts See a Fall, Others Poor Data,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1996, at CIO. Kolata criticized THEO COLBURN ET AL., OUR STOLEN
FUTURE (1996); see also Gina Kolata, Are U.S. Men Less Fertile?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1996, at
A14. For examples of lawyers grappling with these issues in a legal context, see Frank B. Cross,
When Environmental Regulations Kill: The Role of Health/Health Analysis, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 729
(1995) and Alon Rosenthal et al., Legislating Acceptable Cancer Risk from Exposure to Toxic
Chemicals, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 269 (1992).
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decision as to the proper form of a remedy to complete cleanup of the site. 91
Suppose also that after a predetermined period of time,92 ranging anywhere
from three to twenty years, the medical monitoring results came back, and
indicated that the likelihood of contamination from the herbicide and pesticide
manufacturing conducted at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal was statistically
insignificant. Such a result would suggest ihat appropriate cleanup would not
require one of the more expensive procedures, such as incinerating the soil
underneath the nearly 100-acre area or taking other steps to return the site to
its pre-contamination condition. Instead, the landowners could promptly turn
the site over to a productive use, such as commercial or residential
development.
In this way, medical monitoring would satisfy at least two of the
principal goals of CERCLA reform; it would enhance cost-efficiency and
increase community participation.93 Admittedly, in the short term, this
approach would impede the goal of faster cleanups because of the periods of
time needed to conduct the monitoring and acquire statistically meaningful
results. However, if the first fifteen years of CERCLA's existence
demonstrated anything, it is that there are no fast solutions in the business of
hazardous waste cleanup. Furthermore, in the long-term the diagnostic use of
medical monitoring would produce faster cleanups since data acquired from
one cleanup could inform the choice of clean-up remedies elsewhere. Most
importantly, failure to adopt such an approach will destroy the Act's
consequentialist purpose-" [b]ecause Superfund is a general health and welfare
statute, public health must be the primary issue considered in debating
Superfund reauthorization." 
94
Conversely, if medical monitoring at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal
demonstrated that exposure to the hazardous substances used there was severe
and threatening to human health, more costly cleanup would be appropriate.
This result would, once again, influence the choice of remedy adopted at other
sites where similar substances were used or stored. If substantial
contamination were the case, results acquired from medical monitoring would
also provide an incentive for producers of the hazardous materials to
91. In fact, the Daigle court observed that: "With some uncertainty because of the factual
immaturity of the case and the complete lack of appellate guidance, the district court denied the
motions to dismiss the CERCLA medical monitoring claims." 972 F.2d at 1531.
92. Presumably to be agreed upon with the assistance of expert medical opinion.
93. See supra note 89.
94. Osborn & Williams, supra note 7, at 7. The likelihood that this tragic result might occur
seemed strong until CERCLA reauthorization became less urgent in the face of other political
struggles in early 1996. See, e.g., Superfund: Reform Outline 'Unfair, Unworkable' In Some
Areas, Browner Tells Senator, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 560 (July 14, 1995).
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internalize their externalities. As noted at the beginning of this Article, this
notion-commonly known as "the polluter pays principle"-was one of the
animating purposes behind CERCLA.
95
IV. THE ADVANTAGES OF-AND CONCERNS RAISED BY-
MEDICAL MONITORING
Without question, the view advanced in this Article is not without
problems. As noted at the outset, fairness concerns have plagued CERCLA
since its inception. The medical monitoring proposals advanced in this Article
will not eliminate these concerns. Specifically, implementation of medical
monitoring may raise concerns regarding the purposes for which medical
monitoring data will be used. Under CERCLA, owners and operators, among
other "potentially responsible parties," may be required to pay the cost of
cleaning up a contaminated site. 96  As previously acknowledged, medical
monitoring funded by these parties could produce data that would subsequently
be used against them in private toxic tort actions. It is difficult to deny that
there is something troubling about this result, which could require a party to
fund research that may produce self-incriminating information. This Article
has no easy solution for this problem, except to note that, for example, the
police power is often used to justify actions that otherwise might be deemed
due process violations. 97 Moreover, given the inherently uncertain effects of
hazardous waste, and given the fact that large corporations make substantial
profits generating that waste, it is not unfair-and is, once again, wholly
98consonant with CERCLA's original purposes -that these corporations bear
responsibility for the human health effects of that waste. Indeed, if monitoring
generates information that is damaging to the producer of that waste, this
should be viewed as a risk inherent in producing and disposing of such
materials.
99
Conversely, proponents of medical monitoring have a different
concern, which is the equivalent to the notion of "capture" in administrative
law and procedure: 100 If Congress provides for medical monitoring as part of
CERCLA cleanups, controls insuring that the monitoring takes place
95. See supra note 23.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1988).
97. Prime examples are civil forfeiture actions in which land owned by innocent persons may
be seized if the property was used without their actual knowledge in connection with criminal
activities. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing, 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
98. See supra note 6.
99. See supra note 29.
100. WILLIAM DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 2.3, at 37.
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independent of the owners and operators will be necessary. Owners and
operators should not be responsible for choosing the monitors and determining,
for example, the duration and extent of monitoring. Giving the ATSDR an
oversight role over private cleanups may provide the solution. Thus, the
ATSDR could oversee -medical monitoring plans, both by drafting regulations
to be promulgated under the authority of the Environmental Protection Agency
and by, for instance, compiling lists of acceptable laboratories and doctors
who-independent of owners, operators and companies who produce
hazardous substances-would be authorized to oversee such activities.
Another fairness concern relates to one of the central criticisms of
current CERCLA cleanups, namely, the problem of the de micromis party.'10
Medical monitoring should not impose additional burdens on parties who
unwittingly take some action that brings them within CERCLA's broad
regulatory reach, such as the contractor described above who became a
potentially responsible party after he moved contaminated soil from one part of
a contaminated site to another part of the same site.1°2 However, although this
is a serious concern, it is easily solved. Issuing regulations that limit the
liability of such parties for the costs of medical monitoring would handle the
problem. 
103
The precedential use of medical monitoring data is another area
requiring careful consideration. CERCLA currently assigns potentially
responsible parties a share of liability proportionate to their contribution to the
contamination.10 4 There is no reason why this principle should not also apply
to medical monitoring costs, when those costs merely serve the diagnostic
function of identifying the extent and nature of hazardous substance
contamination on human and environmental health. However, an amended
CERCLA should clearly prohibit the use of the results of such data to assign
identical proportionate responsibility in subsequent toxic tort actions. Suppose,
for instance, that a housing developer owns the site of a former chemical
manufacturing plant. While, as a policy matter, CERCLA may require that
the owner contribute to any cleanup, 105 it would be troubling if the developerwas later required to pay for medical treatment of injuries s/he did not cause;
101. See supra note 13.
102. See supra note 12.
103. See similarity to EPA Guidance cited supra note 5.
104. This principle is based on courts' interpretation of CERCLA's "contribution" provision.
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1994). For a recent discussion of the jurisprudence on contribution actions,
see T H Agriculture & Nutrition Co., v. Aceto Chemical Co., 884 F. Supp. 357, 360 (E.D. Cal.
1995) and Transtech Indus. v. A & Z Septic Clean, 798 F. Supp. 1079, 1086 (D.N.J. 1992)
("Under general legal principles, a claim for contribution is one in which one liable party attempts
to recover from another potentially liable party for its share of the cost.").
105. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1986).
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the developer's contribution to the overall contamination is not necessarily
proportional to his/her contribution to the injuries suffered. Thus, while
attorneys could use medical monitoring data to prove causation under common
law tort claims, it should not be a basis for assigning liability to those whose
fault can be definitively established under other, well-established tests. 06
Finally, and of the most concern, are the practical issues that would
accompany the medical monitoring, including the difficulties inherent in
identifying the class of persons to be monitored and determining the duration
of the monitoring period. Clearly, reasonable minds will disagree on the
appropriate limits to be observed in both respects, and there is a potential for
monitoring abuse in the form of over-deterrence in monitoring plans that test
unacceptably large numbers of people for overly long periods and for an
inappropriate range of medical conditions. Although this concern is
significant, recent cases suggest that even non-scientist judges are capable of
interpreting differing scientific opinions so as to render appropriate decisions
on such questions.
There is also an ethical question inherent in the pro-monitoring
position: Will monitoring itself cause psychological injury by alerting people to
the possibility of harm? Arguably, in the expanding world of tort liability this
situation could lead, for example, to a tort for cancerphobia. 108  Moreover,
even when monitoring identifies a harm, there is some question as to whether
106. See, e.g., supra notes 35, 57.
107. See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 838-41 (3d Cir. 1990).
However, it would be glib to suggest that these issues do not seriously challenge courts' abilities.
The most famous example is Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448
U.S. 607, 656 (1979) (in a plurality opinion, holding that the Occupational Health and Safety
Administration was allowed to set a standard for human exposure to benzene if the decision was
supported by "reputable scientific thought"). See also Victor B. Flatt, OSHA Regulation of Low-
Exposure Carcinogens: A New Approach to Judicial Analysis of Scientific Evidence, 14 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 283, 289-92 (1991) (examining difficulties associated with judicial reactions to
probabalistic scientific assessments when legal standards of proof require greater certainty).
The decision to qualify someone as an expert rests not on the specific academic
degree held, but on the presence of sufficient knowledge, skill, experience,
training or education. It would make little sense to exalt the opinion of a
medical doctor with no experience in toxic exposure over the opinion of, for
example, an eminently qualified toxicologist with a Ph.D. and years of
experience and training.
In re Paoli, 916 F.2d at 862.
108. See generally Levit, supra note 50. In recent years, this sort of concern has gained
considerable attention in the popular press. See, e.g., Gary Taubes, Fields of Fear, THE ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Nov. 1, 1994, at 94-108 (arguing that anxiety caused by scientifically unsubstantiated
concern about electromagnetic fields is a greater problem than the alleged damage caused by high-
voltage power lines). See also Nicholas Wade, Method and Madness: Trial and Errors, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., July 24, 1994 (discussing the incompatibility of legal and scientific standards of
causation).
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such information will benefit individuals, at least in circumstances where no
satisfactory treatments are available. 109 In response, however, it is generally
true that affected communities believe that worrying in the absence of reliable
scientific data is worse than worrying because there is good reason to do so.110
Given the fact that scientists increasinglXI raise serious concerns about the long-
term effects of hazardous substances, it is morally preferable to try and
answer these questions by obtaining hard, empirical data on the human and
environmental reactions to these substances. This is particularly true given that
"it is not the existing risks that are most salient. Instead, the dominant risks
arise from future risk scenarios that involve alternative land uses. . . . Chief
among these future risks is the projection that future residents will reside on
sites that are not currently residential."1
12
Although medical monitoring is not without problems, its many
advantages outweigh what would be manageable difficulties. First and
foremost, medical monitoring will force not only the owners and operators of
hazardous waste sites, but also the producers of hazardous substances, to
internalize the costs of their activities. Second, medical monitoring would
produce hard, empirical data on the human and environmental health effects of
hazardous waste contamination. As a result, the statute would operate more
efficiently, a long-term aim of CERCLA reformers. With the average cost of
109. This is yet another ethical issue that has recently received a considerable amount of
popular attention. See, e.g., Gina Kolata, New Ability to Find Earliest Cancers: A Mixed
Blessing?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1994, at C4.
110. The residents of the Lipari landfill, to cite but one example, have repeatedly made this
clear. See supra notes 43-44; Hill Leaders, supra note 5.
John Rosenthal, head of the NAACP's Environmental Justice initiative, said
EPA should relocate residents as a least cost alternative to cleanup. When
communities have access to correct information in risk and exposure, they
won't call for extremely conservative cleanups, but will accept more realistic
clean-up goals . . . . Conservative goals are only called for when residents
don't understand what's going on and rationalize that cleanest is safest for
them.
Id.
111. See, e.g., Gina Kolata, Study Finds Sperm Counts Are Declining, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2,
1995, at A19 (reporting on study in New England Journal of Medicine documenting reduced human
sperm counts and hypothesizing that toxic substances in the environment are a cause). Further
explanation of this view for non-scientific readers can be found in, for example, Wat Causes
Declining Sperm, RACHEL'S ENV'T & HEALTH WKLY., # 492, May 2, 1996. See also Beverly
Paigen, Can Some Environmental Chemicals Act Like Female Hormones?, EVERYONE'S BACKYARD
6 (Summer 1994).
112. Hamilton & Viscusi, supra note 17, at 608. Hamilton and Viscusi examined data for 78
Superfund sites and found that future risks accounted for "over 90% of all the risk-weighted
pathways for the Superfund sites in our sample." Id.
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a CERCLA cleanup running a staggering $25 million,113 this is a goal that
serves not only those whose health may have been compromised from living or
working near a CERCLA site. Monitoring would also serve the interests of
business. 11 4  Information acquired regarding the health effects of hazardous
substances would provide clear, useful data to help both businesses and
consumers regulate their mutual long-term interests, and would help all parties
set definitive environmental priorities. Moreover, this data could lead to
increasingly uniform and efficient responses to problems of hazardous
contamination. This is not to say that monitoring will not produce
contradictory data and information at the outset. On the contrary, some initial
confusion is quite likely. However, in the long run medical monitoring can
help produce a consensus on the types of cleanups that require the greatest
attention, and on the appropriate course to follow in such cleanups.
Third, medical monitoring would have a clear deterrent effect, as it
would discourage manufacturers from producing substances with probable
deleterious health effects.115 Fourth, and on a related note, medical monitoring
would help reorient production processes towards safer and environmentally-
sustainable goods and products. Fifth, medical monitoring would remove the
regulatory burden from the EPA and its understaffed and under-funded
adjunct, the ATSDR, and place that burden on private parties responsible for
cleanup, a desirable effect in our current anti-regulatory climate.
Sixth, it is important not to underestimate the moral advantages of the
minority view regarding CERCLA medical monitoring costs. By reorienting
the statute to focus on human and environmental health, medical monitoring
would avoid the moral hazards present when clean-up decisions are based
113. Robert H. Harris & Ridgeway M. Hall, Jr., Superfund Response Cost Allocations: The
Law, The Science, and The Practice, C948 (ALI-ABA) 151, 155 (1994).
114. There are some indications that, in light of the changing corporate and regulatory
landscape, the proposals outlined in this article would not meet unbending resistance from the
business sector. See, e.g., Michael Baram, The New Environment for Protecting Corporate
Information, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 545, 545-48 (1994) (arguing that pressures on business to self-
police and make available information about environmental performance is changing the corporate
view of what information is protected). Presumably, House Speaker Newt Gingrich endorsed this
goal when he argued in favor of reforming CERCLA into a "results based, instead of process
based" statutory scheme. See Hill Leaders, supra note 5.
Moreover, data obtained through monitoring could be used to conduct much needed
Superfund risk assessments, as urged by Hamilton & Viscusi, supra note 17, at 609-10.
115. Imagine, for example, what might have been the difference in the management of the
Hanford Nuclear Reservation, described in Hanford Downwinders, supra note 81, if the plutonium
producer knew that its operations might ultimately require it to fund medical monitoring of the
health effects of its radioactive and other hazardous substances. Presumably, because of the
possible tort actions that could follow such monitoring, the producer might have altered its
operations substantially.
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solely on the costs involved or speculations about the likely harm (or not) of
various clean-up strategies when no effort is made to validate those
speculations.
V. CONCLUSION
Not long after the November 1996 presidential election, CERCLA
reform is highly likely. Just as its original sponsors viewed the statute as an
ambitious, corrective measure focused on addressing the consequences of our
behavior as members of a highly industrialized, consumer society, so too its
amenders should recognize that the statute, above all, aims to protect human
health. One sure way to effectuate that goal is to, when amending CERCLA,
explicitly provide for medical monitoring as a routine diagnostic cost of
conducting cleanups at hazardous waste sites.
